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Abstract
Past research has largely focused on how emotional expressions provide information about 
the speaker’s emotional state, but has generally neglected vocal affect’s influence over 
communication effectiveness. This is surprising given that other nonverbal behaviors often 
influence communication between individuals. In the present theory paper, we develop a 
novel perspective called the Contextual Influences of Vocal Affect (CIVA) model to pre‑
dict and explain the psychological processes by which vocal affect may influence com‑
munication through three broad categories of process: emotion origin/construal, changing 
emotions, and communication source inferences. We describe research that explores poten‑
tial moderators (e.g., affective/cognitive message types, message intensity), and mecha‑
nisms (e.g., emotional assimilation, attributions, surprise) shaping the effects of vocally 
expressed emotions on communication. We discuss when and why emotions expressed 
through the voice can influence the effectiveness of communication. CIVA advances theo‑
retical and applied psychology by providing a clear theoretical account of vocal affect’s 
diverse impacts on communication.
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Introduction
Our nonverbal emotional signals help others to recognize what we are feeling (Niedenthal, 
2007), shape decision‑making in interpersonal negotiations (Pietroni et al., 2008; Sinaceur 
& Tiedens, 2006), and secure effective communication with others (Guyer et  al., 2019; 
Ottati et al., 1997; Van Kleef et al., 2011, 2015). Research on nonverbal, emotional signals 
often focuses on facial expressions (e.g., smiling, frowning; Dimberg et al., 2000). How‑
ever, a growing literature suggests that vocal affect (i.e., conveying emotions through the 
voice) is also crucial in communication (Guyer et al., 2018; Juslin & Scherer, 2005; Kap‑
pas et al., 1991). The present work is a theoretical paper that aims to outline some concep‑
tual principles regarding how vocal affect may shape communication effectiveness. In so 
doing, our goal is to organize past research and provide an organizational framework that 
can highlight potentially productive avenues for future research.
Vocal Affect in the Communication Process
People show highly sensitive and specific recognition of vocal affect (Banse & Scherer, 
1996; Bänziger et al., 2014). Indeed, the ability to accurately identify different emotions 
in the voice does not even require that listeners understand the language to which they 
are exposed (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Pell et al., 2009), highlighting people’s exquisite 
sensitivity to vocal affect. At minimum, vocal affect communicates the underlying person‑
ality, attitudes, and feelings of a speaker (Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007). For example, when 
people feel specific emotions, they speak with corresponding profiles of speech melody, 
disturbance, tempo, and other vocal cues (Wallbott & Scherer, 1986).
Vocal affect plays critical roles in social life, including inter‑group processes (e.g., in‑
group vocal affect recognition advantages, Laukka et  al., 2016) and relationship dynam‑
ics (e.g., vocal affect patterns involved in demand‑withdraw behaviors, Baucom et  al., 
2011), and facilitates quick inferences about other people’s perspectives (Juslin & Scherer, 
2005). However, research seldom has examined vocal affect’s connection with communica‑
tive success (i.e., the successful transfer of information from speaker to recipient). This 
absence is surprising because communication is so often vocalized (e.g., television, public 
speeches, private conversations). Furthermore, affect is central to research on at least one 
major type of communication: persuasion, in which a source attempts to change a recipi‑
ent’s opinion of an object (see Petty et al., 2003). Yet, there is little clarity regarding how 
and why vocal affect impacts the success of communications. The present article provides 
a theoretical framework to address this gap.
Affective and Cognitive Communication of Evaluations
People often form and communicate their opinions on the basis of both affective con‑
tent (i.e., how an object makes them feel) and cognitive content (i.e., attributes that an 
object is believed to possess; Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999), and vocal affect 
may play distinct roles in these contexts. First, people’s opinions about objects are often 
rooted in affective reactions they have towards those objects (Forgas, 2010; Olson & 
Kendrick, 2008; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). We borrow the term objects from the attitudes 
literature, where it refers to any physical object, person, social group, or even abstract 
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concept that people can hold opinions towards (e.g., Ostrom, 1989). Affective commu‑
nications operate by having listeners feel key emotions which then become guides for 
recipients’ post‑message opinions (e.g., making people feel disgust towards drugs so 
that they will dislike drugs). For instance, the This is Your Brain on Drugs campaign 
(Cutler & Thomas, 1994) associated drugs with various disgusting and fearful imagery. 
Ideally, if people associate drugs with disgust and fear, they will dislike drugs because 
people generally dislike gross, scary things.
A connected question is how one can conceptualize the link between a given type 
of vocal affect (e.g., an excited voice) and an affectively‑based communication. A con‑
tinuum of congruence/incongruence can be conceptualized between vocal affect and the 
emotion expressed in the content of an affective message (Guyer et  al., 2018). Vocal 
affect is congruent when a speaker vocally expresses an emotion (e.g., sounding scared) 
that is perceived as matching the emotion present in the message itself (e.g., fear‑based 
message). Vocal affect is incongruent when it is perceived as differing from the mes‑
sage’s emotions (e.g., a calm voice paired with fear‑inducing message content).
But when will people generally perceive that two emotions (i.e., the emotion in a 
message, and the message in a speaker’s voice) are congruent versus incongruent? 
Strictly speaking, the voice might have to express an emotion identical to the emotion a 
message expresses to be considered congruent. More practically, however, people likely 
perceive a continuum from complete congruence to complete incongruence, and sev‑
eral perceived dimensions of emotions determine the degree of congruence between 
vocal affect and message content. These dimensions may include the valence (positivity 
versus negativity) and arousal (enervated versus energetic) of emotions. Dimensional 
approaches are frequently identified in studies of emotions, and often receive some evi‑
dentiary support (Bakker et  al., 2014; Huelsman et  al., 1998; Mehrabian, 1996). For 
example, Remington and colleagues’ (2000) study of self‑reported emotions found mod‑
erate support for a circumplex model, in which valence and arousal are modeled as two 
major dimensions of emotions (also see Russell, 1980). Apple and Hecht (1982) also 
provided evidence that people may rely on arousal and valence dimensions in their rec‑
ognition of vocally‑expressed emotion (also see Bachorowski, 1999). In sum, there is 
at least tentative support for the idea that congruence and incongruence might be effec‑
tively modeled by varying emotions along valence and arousal dimensions. We label 
emotions congruent when they match on valence and arousal, partially incongruent 
when they mismatch on one dimension but mismatch on the other, and fully incongruent 
when they mismatch on both dimensions.
Certainly, modern perspectives on emotions often advance more complex systems for 
understanding emotions (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) compared to simple valence/
arousal frameworks (also see Goudbeek & Scherer, 2010). Ultimately, our model does not 
assume the validity of any one system by which people might gauge emotional (in)congru‑
ence, and the arousal/valence approach is simply a convenient heuristic because listeners 
clearly recognize at least these dimensions of emotional speech.
Communication may also rely on cognitive information, which changes people’s beliefs 
about an object’s positive and/or negative attributes. These attributes often become guides 
to evaluating the object (Haddock et al., 2008; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; See et al., 2008). 
For instance, the ‘Know Overdose’ ad campaign has distributed information about the 
harms of drug use to the public, generally avoiding affect‑provoking imagery in favor of 
facts and statistics (Harm Reduction Coalition, 2020). With the novel CIVA model, which 
explores the Contextual Influences of Vocal Affect, we propose that vocal affect can influ‑
ence the outcomes of both affective and cognitive communication types; however, the 
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processes by which vocal affect influences affectively‑based and cognitively‑based com‑
munication differ.
Contextual Influences of Vocal Affect: CIVA
Although numerous psychological mechanisms could link vocal affect to evaluations being 
effectively communicated, we theorize that these mechanisms can be meaningfully organ‑
ized into three primary categories. Each category comprises several mechanisms that con‑
nect vocal affect to communication. First, vocal affect may alter recipients’ judgments 
and attributions regarding their emotions (emotion origin/construal). Second, vocal affect 
may lead recipients to change the type and/or the magnitude of emotions they are feeling 
(changing emotions). Third, vocal affect may lead recipients to form inferences about the 
communication’s source that may then impact how recipients respond to communicated 
information (communication source inferences). Each category shapes the degree of com‑
municative success likely to occur in a distinct way.
We have outlined the key features of the CIVA model in Fig. 1, which can be followed 
from the top to the bottom, along paths that reflect contextual factors in the communication 
environment. The bolded/unitalicized cells each reflect one of the CIVA categories (i.e., 
emotion origin/construal, changing emotions, and communication source inferences), and 
the bolded/italicized cells each reflect one of the CIVA processes (e.g., validation effect, 
persuasive intent). Broadly, CIVA’s categories of processes are hypothesized to emerge 
differently (or not at all) given affective or cognitive messages, as reflected by this being 
the first (i.e., top) question in Fig. 1. For instance, emotion origin/construal processes are 
more likely to emerge given affective messages, communication source inferences pro‑
cesses are more likely to emerge given cognitive messages, and changing emotions pro‑
cesses are hypothesized to operate in substantially different ways given affective versus 
cognitive messages. Figure 1 is intended to give a broad overview of the complete CIVA 
model, capturing the critical moderators that we propose determine which category of pro‑
cesses, and which process within a given category, will determine vocal affect’s influence 
on communication.
Category One: Emotion Origin/Construal
First, vocal affect may alter the inferences that recipients make about their emotions. Psy‑
chological research has examined people’s inferences and attributions about their emotions, 
which can often prompt very different reactions to the same underlying emotion (Cooper, 
2007; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990; Schwarz et al., 1985). For instance, imagine listening to 
a story that claims that an unfamiliar creature is highly dangerous, prompting you to feel 
some fear. You might wonder if your emotions are proportionate in magnitude, or appro‑
priate in type. Indeed, people desire social validation in many domains (Cialdini, 2009; 
Guadagno et al., 2013). When people seek validation, vocal affect congruent (vs. incon‑
gruent) with their emotions may validate or bolster their emotions. This may be important 
when communicating affective messages that attempt to instill feelings in the recipient to 
communicate an overall judgment (e.g., promoting anger in a recipient so they will dislike 
an object).
A second emotion origin/construal process is attribution. Recipients who feel emo‑
tions when listening to vocal affect may consider possible sources of the emotion from the 
overall communication context. The existing literature on attribution suggests that one’s 
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internal experiences can be pinned to many different origins (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz 
et al., 1985; Wallbott, 1986; Wyer et al., 1999). For example, if an excited‑sounding actor’s 
message about cheesecake prompts excitement in recipients, recipients might attribute the 
emotion to the cheesecake, to the speaker, to themselves (e.g., to their own cheerful dispo‑
sition), to a contextual origin (e.g., if they just consumed a caffeinated beverage), or any 
combination thereof.
Most clearly, attributions of emotion to the described object have implications for com‑
munication. For example, people who attribute their emotion to the object might infer that 
the object shares the emotion’s valence. In the prior example, the cheesecake is seen as 
good because it is exciting, which might mean the recipient comes to like the cheesecake. 
Attributions to the speaker are somewhat less clear. One possibility is that recipients may 
reason that the speaker’s emotions reflect the speaker’s personal relationship with the 
object (e.g., the speaker is excited by cheesecake, as opposed to cheesecake being objec‑
tively exciting). Depending on how the recipient interprets this information, it may have 
different implications for the recipient’s judgment of the object. For instance, assuming the 
speaker is seen as a valid source of information, their opinion may guide how the recipient 
should view this object. Attributions to the recipient and context are less likely to facilitate 
a communicator’s persuasive goal. For example, if people think they feel excited because 
they see themselves as an excitable person, they may attempt to correct for the positiv‑
ity conferred by their perceived excitement bias (i.e., bias correction; Wegener & Petty, 
1997). This could undermine the speaker’s goal to change a recipient’s attitude by shaping 
their emotional evaluations of the object. Similarly, attributions to the context (e.g., aware‑
ness that one has consumed caffeine pills or considering how upbeat pop music is playing 
nearby) may undermine a communicator’s ability to convey key emotions. In sum, whereas 
attributions of emotions to the object make those emotions diagnostic, and attributions to 
the speaker are moderately diagnostic, attributions to the environment and recipient are 
non‑diagnostic.
Emotion Origin/Construal: Moderators
CIVA proposes several factors that control which process is more likely within emotion ori‑
gin/construal. For example, emotion‑validation effects are more likely when recipients are 
uncertain whether their emotional reactions are appropriate and proportionate. This uncer‑
tainty is probably more likely when emotional information about an object is somewhat 
ambivalent, such as when an object seems intensely exciting but also intensely distressing. 
A positive message about skydiving may call up positive feelings (e.g., excitement) in a 
recipient, but also evoke negative feelings (e.g., terror). Emotional validation provided by 
a source’s vocal affect may help resolve the ambiguity. Lots of vocalized excitement may 
thus secure the dominance of people’s excitement over their fear.
Attributional mechanisms should be predominant if the origin of recipients’ emotions 
(e.g., if those emotions are caused by a described object versus by a speaker) are ambigu‑
ous. For example, suppose that recipients again consider the positive message about sky‑
diving, but have recently consumed some placebo pills they believe contained caffeine. 
Recipients might then attribute arousal produced by the communicated message to the caf‑
feine rather than to skydiving (Cooper, 2007; Zillmann et al., 1972). Here, the speaker’s 
vocal affect could cement one attributional path over another. For example, a (presumably 
non‑caffeinated) source who sounds excited should redirect recipients’ attribution of their 
excitement from the caffeine to the object by the principle of consensus (Kelley, 1973).
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 
1 3
Emotion Origin/Construal Given Affective Messages
Most of the emotion origin/construal processes primarily make sense in the context of 
affective messages. These processes shape whether emotions are perceived as diagnos‑
tic guides to evaluating objects, but this presupposes that emotions are emphasized in the 
communication. It matters less if people attribute their irritability to their own tempera‑
ment, the speaker’s voice, or their uncomfortable chair–if anger is completely irrelevant 
to the communication. But if a communicator needs the listener to feel angry and ascribe 
that anger to some object’s being bad, these attributions matter substantially. We further 
hypothesize that emotion origin/construal processes will be more influential given high‑
intensity affective messages. For instance, participants’ inferences about high‑intensity 
anger is likely to have extreme consequences, whereas their inferences about low‑intensity 
anger is not likely to seriously impact their thoughts or behaviors.
Empirical research. Before we introduce the specific experimental work that examines 
emotion origin/construal processes, we return to the distinction between (in)congruence 
between vocal affect and message content. When listeners are focused on making infer‑
ences about the origins of their emotions, incongruence may produce some communication 
advantages. Figure 2 plots how affective messages might influence communication effec‑
tiveness, flowing from left to right. To begin, affective communications should induce an 
emotional feeling in the recipient (a). However, for recipients’ emotions to substantially 
impact communication effectiveness, those emotions may need to be attributed to the 
object (b). In particular, path b represents a judgment that the recipient is feeling a given 
emotion because of the qualities of the object itself: the recipient thinks that object pro‑
vokes this emotion in them. If the object provoked their emotion, the emotion should be 
perceived as diagnostic for evaluating the object (c). That is, people will presumably dis‑
like objects that are thought to be responsible for their own negative emotions, and presum‑
ably like objects that provoke positive emotions in themselves. However, people may also 
attribute emotions to the speaker (d). Speaker attributions have a somewhat ambiguous rel‑
evance to communication because recipients might feel that their emotions are due to the 
source’s idiosyncratic relationship with the object (e). Finally, recipients may attribute their 
emotions to their own dispositions, or to the environment.1
Fig. 2  Theoretical model linking vocal affect with affective messages
1 Neither of these attributions seems likely to help communication effectiveness (nor hinder it, other than 
drawing attention from object/source attributions), so we have not modeled these in Fig. 2.
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Certainly, incongruent vocal affect could decrease the amount of emotion that people are 
feeling (f). However, recall that emotion origin/construal processes are predicted to occur 
in the context of the very intense affective messages; thus, listeners would be expected to 
be experiencing the message’s communicated emotion intensely due to the message itself. 
The more important role of vocal affect here might involve changing the attributions that 
people make about these intense emotions.
People experiencing an emotion when listening to an emotional message by an emo‑
tional speaker have an attributional puzzle to solve: what/who is responsible for this emo‑
tion they feel? When the speaker’s voice does not match the message’s affective content, it 
seems unlikely that people will attribute their emotions to the speaker. Consequently, the 
object should be seen as proportionately more likely to be causing the recipients’ feelings. 
Thus, an incongruent voice is likely to substantially increase (g) the likelihood that emo‑
tions will be attributed to the object (b), subsequently increasing the probability that these 
emotions will be used as diagnostic guides to the object, boosting communicative success 
(c). Incongruent voices should decrease the odds that recipients’ emotions will be attrib‑
uted to the speaker (path h). Decreasing speaker attributions may slightly undermine com‑
munication because speaker attributions are moderately diagnostic (e).
For example, consider an intensely affective message about the horrors of global warm‑
ing read by a happy speaker. Listeners will probably feel sad even though the speaker 
sounds happy, due to the intense emotionality of the communication’s contents. Moreover, 
listeners will probably associate their sadness to global warming rather than the speaker, 
since it should seem quite unlikely that the speaker’s happy voice made listeners feel 
depressed. If listeners attribute sadness to global warming, and sadness is a negative emo‑
tion, this should prompt more negative judgments about global warming. Since the com‑
munication was trying to lead people to a negative opinion of global warming, this would 
increase communicative success.
To empirically test these ideas, we recently conducted a line of research that isolates 
vocal affect rather than combining it with other nonverbal signals (compare Van Kleef 
et al., 2015), and holds message content constant across all conditions (Guyer et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, this research used a highly‑intense affective message that should reward 
incongruence. We conducted three experiments in which participants were exposed to an 
affective message about an ostensibly real aquatic mammal called a lemphur.
In each experiment in Guyer and colleagues (2018), participants were exposed to an ini‑
tially positive written essay about the lemphur and expressed their initial attitudes towards 
the lemphur via self‑report (Crites et al., 1994). Next, participants were asked to listen to 
a negative, affective message about lemphurs. Specifically, the passage described a hor‑
rific encounter in which a lemphur kills and eats a human swimmer (see Fabrigar & Petty, 
1999). Although the content of this message was always identical (a strong, fear‑based 
message), we randomly assigned how the message was communicated across four condi‑
tions. Some participants simply read a transcript of the message (written condition). The 
other participants heard one of three spoken recorded versions of the message, always spo‑
ken by the same acting student (a man). In one version, the speaker used a fearful voice 
(i.e., fully congruent with the message). In another, the speaker sounded bored (i.e., par-
tially incongruent, matching the message on valence but mismatching on arousal). Finally, 
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other participants heard a version in which the speaker sounded content (i.e., fully incon-
gruent from the message).2 Finally, participants expressed their attitudes for a second time.
Note that one could reasonably speculate that a congruence pattern would occur: 
intuitively, pairing a fear‑based message with a fearful voice seems logical, and we will 
explore this sort of assimilation logic in Category Two (changing emotions). Alternatively, 
an incongruence pattern could occur, assuming that incongruent vocal affect increases 
the attribution of speaker emotions to judgments about the object (see Fig. 2). The CIVA 
model breaks this stalemate by pointing to the experimental context: An attribution effect 
should occur because the affective message was intense, elevating the likelihood of emotion 
origin/construal effects. Across three experiments, communication success was increased 
(compared to the written condition) only when the speaker’s voice was partially incon‑
gruent or fully incongruent with the message (Guyer et al., 2018). The congruent voice, 
however, did not elicit increased communication success relative to a written message. 
Furthermore, the incongruent voices each produced more communication success than the 
congruent voice. Finally, the two incongruent voices did not differ from one another with 
respect to communication success. Therefore, speakers may better communicate their opin‑
ions when speaking with emotions that mismatch their communication’s affective content. 
Ironically, the speaker was more persuasive about the dangers of a violent animal when 
speaking in a voice that sounded bored, rather than sounding terrified. Though initially 
counter‑intuitive, the CIVA model explains exactly why this would occur, and proposes 
mechanisms that should account for this reaction: specifically, different attributions occur‑
ring across the vocal affect conditions.
Indeed, incongruent voices changed people’s attributions of their fear to primarily view 
the object (i.e., the lemphur) versus the source (i.e., the speaker) as responsible (Guyer 
et al., 2018, Exp. 2–3). Verifying Fig. 2’s path g, incongruent voices led people to make 
more emotion attributions to the lemphur; and verifying path c, this increased communica‑
tion of negative opinions about lemphurs. Thus, not only did incongruence increase com‑
munication, CIVA’s proposed mechanism emerged clearly: incongruence made the object 
seem particularly responsible for listeners’ feelings, which made those emotions a highly 
diagnostic guide for judging the object. Furthermore, verifying path h, incongruence made 
people less inclined to attribute their emotions to the speaker. Consistent with CIVA, 
incongruent speakers form unlikely explanations for why one feels a message’s emotions, 
because the incongruent voice mismatches those emotions. Interestingly, we found that 
path e slightly increased communicative success. In other words, incongruence made peo‑
ple less likely to pin their emotions on the speaker, and this slightly undermined communi‑
cative success because communication increased when people attributed their emotions to 
the speaker.3
In Experiment 3 of Guyer and colleagues (2018), we replicated the core communication 
effects again. Furthermore, we replicated our attribution effects: once again, incongruence 
led to relatively more object versus speaker attributions, and this bolstered communica‑
tive success because object attributions were more related to attitude change than were 
speaker attributions. Importantly, Experiment 3 also considered three other CIVA mecha‑
nisms: contrast (a changing emotions process), persuasive intent (communication source 
inferences), and expectancy violation (communication source inferences). None of these 
2 Extensive pilot testing ensured that listeners could accurately detect these intended emotions.
3 The effect size of the speaker‑attribution path was small compared to the object‑attribution path, hence 
why incongruence still increased overall communicative success.
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explanations held up as alternative mechanisms. Indeed, CIVA suggests that contrast is 
unlikely given the intense affective messages, and participants’ self‑reported emotions did 
not vary by condition. Persuasive intent would be implausible according to CIVA due to 
the message being affective rather than cognitive, and indeed persuasive intent was com‑
pletely unrelated to attitude change. Finally, a surprise‑based (i.e., expectancy violation) 
account would be unlikely given the affective nature of the message. Indeed, surprise did 
not account for the data because the calm (fully incongruent) voice was uniquely less sur‑
prising than the other conditions, and yet this voice was associated with more rather than 
less communicative success.
Category Two: Changing Emotions
CIVA’s next category of processes relates to situations when vocal affect changes the type 
and/or the magnitude of emotions felt by recipients. In other words, this category encom‑
passes both when vocal affect makes a recipient change from feeling one emotion to a dif‑
ferent type of emotion, or when vocal affect increases/decreases the magnitude of a recipi‑
ent’s emotion. This can happen in at least three different ways. First, sometimes vocal affect 
may cause a recipient to experience the emotion that the source is expressing. For exam‑
ple, recipients often assimilate the emotions that other people express (Hatfield & Rapson, 
2008; Hatfield et  al., 1992; Neumann & Strack, 2000), consequently experiencing those 
emotions themselves. For example, a source’s vocal anger may cause a recipient also to feel 
(more) angry. Source emotions need not be explicitly communicated to spread to listeners 
(Neumann & Strack, 2000).
Second, recipients may sometimes contrast how they feel about an object with how the 
speaker appears to feel about the object based on the speaker’s vocal affect. Indeed, con‑
trast effects are often detected in psychology (Martin et al., 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 2007; 
Wanke et al., 2001). For example, recipients who feel slightly angry about political corrup‑
tion might consider that compared to an absolutely enraged anti‑corruption speaker, the 
recipients’ anger seems quite trivial. Consequently, recipients may perceive themselves as 
feeling less anger.
Third, the emotions of sources and recipients need not always mimic or contrast with 
those of a speaker, but may instead sometimes be complementary, referring to emotions 
that differ from a source’s emotion but are responsive to that source’s emotions (Dimberg 
& Ohman, 1996; Keltner & Kring, 1998). For instance, a recipient who is personally criti‑
cized by an angry voice may not feel anger themselves, but rather might feel ashamed, sad, 
or even fearful.
Moderators of Specific Changing Emotions Processes
Summarizing the prior section, hearing a source’s vocal affect may generate either more 
of that emotion (assimilation), less of that emotion (contrast), or an entirely different emo‑
tion (complementary reaction) in recipients. CIVA offers guidance through moderators that 
control when each process is most likely to emerge. For example, what factors may switch 
recipients between assimilation versus contrast effects? Past research indicates that assimi‑
lation is often more likely to occur than contrast when a particular influence is present 
but not particularly salient in people’s attention (Schwarz & Bless, 2007), a principle that 
equally might apply to vocal affect (i.e., when a person speaks with subtle vocal affect). 
However, sometimes vocal affect’s influence on recipients might become quite salient, for 
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instance if the source’s vocal affect itself is very extreme or if recipients are encouraged to 
listen carefully to the speaker’s voice. In these situations, recipients may engage in active 
bias correction (Martin, 1986; Martin et  al., 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1997), attempting 
to suppress this contamination of their judgment (e.g., dampening their anger when they 
realize that their anger is caused by a speaker). However, even very salient influences like 
vocal affect will not automatically provoke contrast effects if the influence is deemed to 
be valid. People may recognize that their anger is driven by a source’s voice but nonethe‑
less consider the anger legitimate: for instance, if the source is judged as a valid source 
of information about how the recipient should feel.4 Indeed, bias correction models have 
suggested that recipients have to be sufficiently motivated and able to correct bias before 
correction will occur (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997). In short, contrast effects of vocal affect 
may require several preconditions: (i) salience in recipients’ attention, (ii) belief that the 
source’s vocal affect is a bias affecting them, and (iii) ability to correct for this bias.
Complementary emotions may be most likely to emerge depending on the apparent 
target of the vocal affect. Facial expressions directed at (versus away from) the recipient 
provoke complementary reactions (Dimberg & Ohman, 1983). Likewise, when a recipient 
recognizes that they are the target of a source’s vocally expressed emotions (versus there 
being no particular target), complementary reactions also may be more likely. For example, 
imagine a scenario in which a person angrily chastises a work colleague for smoking in 
front of the entrance to their office building. Rather than feel anger at being reproached, the 
recipient may feel complementary emotions such as shame or guilt. Thus, vocal messages 
that target the recipient (by name, with second‑person language such as ‘you,’ etc.) should 
more likely provoke complementary reactions, as might conditions that lead recipients to 
empathize with the emotional speaker.
Changing Emotions Given Affective Messages
Once changing emotions processes influence people’s emotional reactions to messages, this 
may impact how successful a communication will be, but the exact effects should depend 
on message content. Affective messages rely on producing a particular type of emotion in 
the message’s recipients, so that recipients will use those emotions as guides to evaluating 
the object described in a communication (Haddock et al., 2008; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; 
See et al., 2008). Thus when vocal affect leads to changing emotions effects, this may facil‑
itate communication (if vocal affect produces an emotion in the recipient that matches the 
communication goal), or undermine communication (if vocal affect produces an emotion 
antithetical to the communication goal).
Empirical research. Surprisingly, although the idea that affective messages rely on suc‑
cessful cultivation of appropriate emotions in recipients is well‑documented and there is 
substantial indirect empirical evidence to support the plausibility of the processes we have 
described in this section, there is not extant literature directly demonstrating that vocal 
affect can boost these effects by instilling certain emotions in recipients. This lacuna con‑
stitutes one of the most promising opportunities in the vocal affect literature.
4 For instance, this could be more common among high self‑monitors, who view other people’s reactions as 
a legitimate guide to their own reactions (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000).
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Changing Emotions Given Cognitive Messages
Changing emotions processes may initially seem irrelevant for cognitive communica‑
tion; after all, cognitive messages operate by changing recipients’ beliefs about the 
attributes of objects, not by shaping recipients’ emotions. However, CIVA suggests that 
changing emotions processes should alter the success even of cognitive messages. Emo‑
tions can shape how people receive communications from others, even when these emo‑
tions are substantively irrelevant to the communication’s contents. We elaborate on two 
relevant processes here, although these represent only small samples from a broad lit‑
erature (e.g., Isbell et al., 2013; and see Petty et al., 2003, for a review).
One example is the hedonic contingency perspective, raised by Wegener and his col‑
leagues (1995). This viewpoint suggests that people experiencing positive emotions 
(e.g., happiness) generally wish to maintain these emotions, whereas people experienc‑
ing negative emotions (e.g., sadness) are less protective of their present emotional state 
(also see Wegener & Petty, 1994). Empirical studies support that happy people are more 
sensitive to the hedonic consequences of processing a message. For example, a message 
that seems likely to be upsetting may not be thoroughly processed by a happy person, 
but would be carefully processed by a sad person; however, messages that seem likely to 
provoke positive feelings might be processed regardless of emotional status. Of course, 
this has important consequences for whether a communication successfully alters a 
recipient’s opinion.
Another process that can occur involves emotions’ effects on recipients’ confidence. 
For instance, Briñol and colleagues (2007) had participants read either a weak or a 
strong persuasive message, and afterwards induced participants to feel happy or sad. 
Importantly, the mood induction was substantively irrelevant to the message topic itself. 
Participants led to feel happy (versus sad) had greater confidence in their thoughts, and 
thus the effect of argument quality on communicative success increased. That is, par‑
ticipants who read the weak message and thus generated oppositional thoughts to the 
message, and then felt happy (sad), consequently trusted (distrusted) these negative 
thoughts, and thus were particularly unpersuaded (persuaded). In contrast, participants 
who read a strong message and thus generated supportive thoughts, and then felt happy 
(sad), consequently trusted (distrusted) their positive thoughts, and thus were particu‑
lar persuaded (unpersuaded). However, in Briñol and colleagues’ work emotions were 
manipulated after participants had considered and listed thoughts about the message, 
likely causing emotions to validate those thoughts. If the message itself was read with 
a particular vocal affect, possibly resulting in participants feeling that emotion while 
thinking about the message, this could work against finding thought validation effects 
(Briñol et al., 2007; Petty et al., 2002).
Empirical research. Empirical research justifying this category of processes is best 
described as indirect but very probable given effects found in two distinct literatures. 
First, people’s emotions are clearly shaped by other people’s vocal affect. Indeed, schol‑
ars have argued that a fundamental purpose of vocal affect is to alter listeners’ affect 
(Bachorowski & Owren, 2008; Russell et al., 2003). For example, listening to readings 
of an identical message (a philosophical essay by David Hume) read in a happy, sad, or 
neutral voice led listeners to experience relatively congruent emotions themselves (i.e., 
more sadness/happiness in the sad/happy voice conditions; Neumann & Strack, 2000). 
Interestingly, these authors also found that when listeners then read the same communi‑
cation aloud themselves, they spontaneously tended to mirror the speaker’s vocal affect. 
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This is important because speaking in an emotional tone tends to produce a congruent 
emotional state in the speaker (Hatfield et al., 1992). Thus, for instance, a communica‑
tion source’s vocal sadness may prompt listeners to speak sadly too, producing sadness 
in the listener.
Second, there is good reason to think that recipients’ emotions shape how they pro‑
cess communicated information. We gave two examples above: the hedonic contingency 
view, and thought‑validation effects caused by recipients’ current emotions. Both of these 
hypotheses are rooted in extensive literature, and have been extensively documented. For 
example, the hedonic contingency view is linked with a broader literature concerning mood 
management differences across levels of current emotion (Wegener & Petty, 1994), and its 
effect on message processing has been independently validated (Côtè, 2005; Turner et al., 
2013). Similarly, emotions serving to validate thoughts are linked with a rich background 
literature in which many recipient body states can validate thoughts (for a review, see Petty 
& Briñol, 2015), and emotion‑based thought validation has been replicated and extended 
(Briñol et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, these two literatures are seldom studied together, that is, in research 
where a communication source speaking emotionally shifts recipient emotions, altering 
how the recipient then processes communicated information. However, if the first and sec‑
ond steps of this process (communication source emotion to recipient emotion; recipient 
emotion to judgmental changes) are valid, as we have argued above, it follows that their 
conjunction also should unfold when tested directly.
Category Three: Source Inferences
Finally, CIVA’s communication source inferences category describes how vocal affect 
may prompt recipients to form judgments about the communication source’s attributes and 
motives. Often, beliefs about a communication source’s characteristics can have a large 
effect on the likelihood that a recipient accepts the communication (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 
2009). Vocal affect could alter such inferences about the communication source in numer‑
ous ways.
One consequence of vocal affect is that it could influence recipients’ perceptions that 
the speaker is trying to be persuasive. Past work indicates that forewarnings of persuasive 
intent sometimes decrease communicative success (Lee, 2010; Mühlberger & Jonas, 2019). 
For example, consider a speaker who gruesomely details how cigarettes impact one’s inter‑
nal organs, and further imagine that the speaker’s vocal pattern becomes tremulous and 
fearful as she describes the fear‑inducing effects of tobacco smoke and nicotine addiction. 
Recipients’ perceptions of the persuasive intent of the speaker may increase, especially if 
the vocal affect is seen as mawkish. This could then undermine effective communication.
Additionally, vocal affect might be interpreted by recipients as revealing the speaker’s 
confidence. For example, a highly enthusiastic speaker is likely perceived as quite con‑
fident, given that enthusiasm is understood to signal positive valence (Remington et  al., 
2000) and perhaps high dominance (i.e., because enthusiasm may imply good self‑control 
and agency; Bakker et al., 2014). The positive valence might be taken to mean the speaker 
enjoys what they are discussing, and/or is comfortable speaking; dominance may indicate 
that the speaker feels in control and authoritative, suggesting confidence. If these ideas 
hold, perceptions of confidence should then have downstream consequences for commu‑
nication. Indeed, past research indicates that voices perceived as being high (vs. low) in 
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confidence are often more persuasive, for a variety of reasons (Guyer et al., 2019; Van Zant 
& Berger, 2020).
Finally, people’s beliefs about a source may be challenged or made salient when the 
source violates their expectations of that source, eliciting surprise in recipients. For exam‑
ple, if a communication focuses on specific emotions (e.g., contains words conveying 
excitement), vocal affect reflecting extremely dissimilar emotions (e.g., sadness) might 
elicit surprise because people might expect that a source’s voice should match the tone/
content of their message. Alternatively, messages with relatively low‑stakes content (e.g., 
about a minor new tax policy) might provoke surprise when presented with high‑arousal 
voices (e.g., the person describing the tax policy sounds terrified). In turn, surprise can 
have a variety of communication‑relevant effects. Most critically, surprise may increase the 
amount or depth of processing that people allocate to a communication. Increased process‑
ing potentially boosts communicative success with strong (coherent, logical) communica‑
tions, and weakens communicative success with weak (incoherent, illogical) communica‑
tions (Petty et al., 2001; Schützwohl & Borgstedt, 2005).
Moderators of specific source inferences processes
Persuasive intent should be more likely to guide communicative success when reactance 
concerns (a state of psychological resistance in which people are motivated to resist other 
people’s communications; Miron & Brehm, 2006) are primed in recipients. For example, 
reactance is more common when people feel that their freedom is being constrained (Clee 
& Wicklund, 1980). For instance, Quick and colleagues (Quick et  al., 2015) found that 
when persuading people to list themselves as organ donors, loss‑framed communications 
that highlight negative consequences of failing to self‑register led to increased reactance 
(compared to gain‑framed communications). In contrast, reminders that ultimately recipi‑
ents are free to think as they see fit decrease reactance (Miller et al., 2007), making it less 
likely that vocal affect will operate by shifting perceptions of persuasive intent.
Confidence, too, may vary in its persuasive impact depending on circumstances. For 
example, confident sources increase communication effectiveness when they present strong 
arguments, but actually decrease communication effectiveness when they present weak 
arguments (Tormala et  al., 2006). A likely reason is that confident speakers draw more 
attention than doubtful speakers, but this can backfire when communications are uncon‑
vincing and vacuous (because they promptly counter‑argue bad arguments). Thus, argu‑
ment quality may play a role in when and how vocal confidence impacts communication.
Concerning expectancy violations, one probable moderator is the level of careful think‑
ing that participants are typically devoting to processing the communication. Past theory 
and research indicates that variables are more likely to effectively influence people’s level 
of processing when people’s motivation and ability to think is unconstrained (Baker & 
Petty, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 2001). In contrast, if recipients’ circum‑
stances or dispositions constrain processing to be low or high, surprise is unlikely have 
much effect on the extent to which people will process a communication.
Sources Inferences Given Cognitive Communications
We propose that the communication source inferences processes we have outlined have 
much clearer communication roles given cognitive (rather than affective) communica‑
tion contents. For example, consider how a speaker’s vocal affect may lead one to think 
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that a speaker is confident. This may bias listeners into agreeing with the central claims of 
the speaker’s argument because listeners tend to assume that confident speakers are more 
likely to be correct in their beliefs (Guyer et al., 2019). However, this same inference about 
the speaker being confident is rather ambiguously useful given affective communication. 
For instance, a confident‑sounding speaker could either undermine a communication that 
is trying to convey fear and anxiety to a listener, because it sounds as though the speaker is 
not themselves fearful or anxious; or it may benefit communicative success, if the confident 
speaker simply draws more attention from recipients. Thus, vocal affect would seem likely 
to impact an affective communication via an emotion origins/construal process (attribu‑
tion) rather than a communication source inference per se.
Empirical research. One line of our research explicitly addresses communication source 
inference processes of vocal affect given cognitive communications (Vaughan‑Johnston 
et al., 2019). This work was structurally similar to the Guyer and colleagues (2018) para‑
digm we explained earlier: participants formed and rated their initial opinions about lem‑
phurs based on some mildly positive information. Next, they were exposed to a negative 
communication in one of four conditions: written, or with the communication read by a 
speaker using vocal affect. Attitudes were then measured again to gauge communicative 
success.
In Experiment 1 the communication characterized lemphurs as having problematic 
feeding habits causing harm to nearby communities’ economies (i.e., a negative, cognitive 
communication). Vocal affect conditions included fear and excitement, but also an emo‑
tionless voice that was developed by digitally altering a voice recording (via Praat; see 
Boersma & Weenink, 2018). The emotionless voice controlled for the mere effect of voice 
as people listen to the communication rather than reading it. The fearful voice likely vio‑
lated listeners’ expectations due to its high‑arousal nature (potentially increasing commu‑
nication effectiveness), but also could have undermined the speaker’s perceived confidence 
(potentially decreasing communication effectiveness because the arguments were strong; 
Baker & Petty, 1994). In contrast, the excited voice should improve communication effec‑
tiveness, being both surprising and indicative of higher confidence. In fact, Experiment 1 
provided support only for excitement increasing communication effectiveness, with other 
conditions not differing from one another.
Experiment 2 provided greater clarity about why this pattern emerged, as we also 
included several mechanism variables: participants’ own emotions were measured to help 
rule out that changing emotions processes (i.e., contrast) could be responsible given this 
cognitive communication. An explicit measure of recipients’ feelings of being surprised 
Table 1  Effects of Vocal Affect Conditions on Communication Effectiveness and Mechanisms (Vaughan‑
Johnston et al., 2019, Experiment 2)
Vocal affect conditions
Written control Calm Fear Excitement
Communication effectiveness {baseline} – Increased Increased
Mechanisms
Recipient emotion {baseline} – Increased fear, 
Decreased calm
–
Source confidence {baseline} Decreased Decreased Increased
Surprise {baseline} – Increased Increased
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by the passage’s tone was also included. This mechanism would be plausible given the 
experiment used a cognitive communication (favoring communication source inferences 
processes), and given the unconstrained processing conditions (favoring enhanced process‑
ing specifically). Experiment 2 also included ratings of the speaker’s confidence. Finally, 
the emotionless voice condition was replaced with a calm voice condition. This tested if 
excitement improved communication because excitement is positively‑valenced (i.e., 
because participants who assimilated a positive emotion would be more accepting of the 
communication; Petty et al., 1993). If so, the calm voice should similarly boost communi‑
cation effectiveness.
The calm voice did not improve communication in Experiment 2. Instead, excitement 
again improved communication effectiveness (replicating Experiment 1). Furthermore, 
the fearful voice produced more communication effectiveness. Moreover, the mechanisms 
helped to explain why these patterns occurred. As shown in Table 1, changing emotions 
were a weak explanation for the data, because although the fearful voice prompted emo‑
tions germane to communication effectiveness (e.g., more negative and less positive emo‑
tions for a negative communication), the excited voice did not influence emotions. Second, 
source confidence was a poor explanation for the data because although the excited voice 
was seen as confident, the fearful voice (which also bolstered communication effective‑
ness) was seen as lacking confidence. Third, however, expectancy violation was a good 
explanation for the data, because both the fearful and excited voices were seen as surpris‑
ing. Moreover, ratings of surprise at the speaker’s tone were related to increased com‑
munication effectiveness. This is consistent with the idea that fearful and excited voices 
surprised participants, who then analyzed the communication more carefully; because the 
communication was quite convincing, they were more persuaded (compared to people who 
had read the communication, or received a calm voice).
Pooling Experiment 1 and 2 meta‑analytically, fear improved communication effec‑
tiveness compared to the written message. Excitement also produced more communica‑
tion effectiveness than the written condition. Excitement also out‑performed the fear‑based 
voice.
Although the data presented so far are quite consistent with the CIVA model, an issue 
with our Experiment 2 is the reliance on a measurement‑based assessment of the psycho‑
logical mechanism. The case for expectancy violation would be strengthened further by 
revealing this mechanism via experimental manipulation. For example, if listeners were 
randomly assigned to hold different expectations regarding how the speaker will likely 
speak, and were then randomly assigned to a different voice during the persuasive com‑
munication, the matching versus mismatching with their expectations should provide 
an experimental parallel to Experiment 2. That is, communication effectiveness should 
increase when the later vocal affect differs from whatever vocal affect participants heard 
initially.
Summary
Psychologists are rich in data concerning the processes by which vocal affect is generated, 
communicated, and received, but remain impoverished of theories and data addressing the 
functional significance of expressing vocal affect. In particular, a unified framework for 
relating vocal affect to effective communication is lacking. The CIVA model, by drawing 
together many processes beneath a single explanatory umbrella, provides a useful resource 
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for psychologists and applied researchers hoping to better understand vocal affect’s mul‑
tifaceted relationship to communication effectiveness. The CIVA model posits three cat‑
egories of processes by which vocal affect can influence communicative effectiveness: 
by shifting the emotion origin/construal by which people make sense of their emotions, 
by changing emotions that the recipient is feeling, and by altering communication source 
inferences by which vocal affect bolsters or challenges listeners’ understanding of the 
source’s character, abilities, or intentions.
CIVA posits moderators both within these categories and across categories. For 
instance, assimilation and contrast processes are both examples of changing emotions, 
but each may be more likely under prescribed circumstances (e.g., when people are ver‑
sus are not vigilant to the possibility of assimilation as an unwanted bias). Furthermore, 
changing emotions or communication source inferences categories in general may be more 
likely depending on the communicative context (e.g., depending on the message’s relative 
emphasis on affective or cognitive information). Thus, the CIVA model helps to organize 
research concerning vocal affect and communication, and produces some guiding princi‑
ples to understand when various processes are more or less likely to emerge. Direct empiri‑
cal evidence substantiating the CIVA model is incomplete (particularly for changing emo‑
tions processes), but we have outlined some existing work that is very consistent with the 
model, and suggest specific future research that would clarify several outstanding issues.
Future Research with the CIVA Model
An important limitation is that although all of CIVA’s mechanisms (e.g., assimilation, con‑
trast, persuasive intent) are predicated on a rich background literature, our proposed appli‑
cations to vocal affect are often relatively novel. Consequently, whereas some CIVA mech‑
anisms have quite directly been tested in a vocal affect context (e.g., attribution, expectancy 
violation), others have not (e.g., persuasive intent, social validation). Because it proposes 
moderators quite specific to each proposed mechanism, CIVA can help guide researchers 
in developing experiments that may reveal each process, and enriching theoretical under‑
standing of vocal affect’s many persuasive implications.
Relatedly, CIVA’s moderators that account for which category of mechanism should 
drive vocal affect’s effects are based in much prior literature, but specific applications to 
vocal affect are theoretically novel and await direct testing. For example, attribution effects 
emerge in the context of highly intense affective messages (Guyer et  al., 2018), consist‑
ent with the idea that emotion origin/construal processes should occur for high‑intensity 
affective content. Communication source inferences processes, particularly for expectancy 
violations, emerge for cognitive messages as predicted (Vaughan‑Johnston et  al., 2019). 
Thus, existing evidence is consistent with CIVA’s claims. However, future research should 
target these claims about moderation more directly. For instance, studies could systemati‑
cally vary the intensity of affective messages (low versus high) in a between‑participant 
design to demonstrate that changing emotions processes (i.e., assimilation, contrast, com‑
plementary reactions) emerge more strongly given low‑intensity affect, and emotion origin/
construal processes (i.e., validation, attribution) emerge more strongly given high‑intensity 
affect. Relatedly, studies could contrast an affective against a cognitive communication for 
a direct comparison of emotion origin/construal versus communication source inferences 
processes. For instance, traditional confidence effects should bridge between vocal affect 
and communication effectiveness only for the cognitive, but not for the affective message.
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Extensions to the CIVA Model
Although substantiating all of CIVA’s primary claims is our most immediate concern, 
there are several ways that the model could be extended that future work might explore, 
such as proposing additional mechanisms of vocal affect. One interesting extension of 
the CIVA model might integrate recipients’ pre‑message, message‑irrelevant emotions 
into the model. For example, participants might be manipulated to feel either angry or 
sad before attending to a negative, cognitive message (e.g., describing problems associ‑
ated with a new tax policy) vocalized by an angry‑ or sad‑sounding speaker. Matching 
of source vocal affect to recipients’ pre‑message affect could facilitate communication 
effectiveness for several reasons. DeSteno and colleagues (DeSteno et al., 2004) found 
that pre‑message anger, for example, promoted a thought bias favoring angry‑ over 
sadness‑framed messages (and vice versa for pre‑message sadness) at least among par‑
ticipants who were dispositionally inclined to think carefully. Recipients might feel that 
a source is similar to themselves insofar as that speaker’s vocal affect mirrors (versus 
clashes with) their own emotions. Given that people prefer similar over dissimilar others 
(Burleson & Denton, 1992; Philipp‑Muller et al., 2020), they may also feel more liking 
for a source whose vocal affect suggests shared emotional experiences to themselves. In 
turn, liking a message’s source may improve communication success (Roskos‑Ewoldsen 
& Fazio, 1992).
Another possibility is that high‑arousal voices could lead participants to assume that 
the source considers the topic to be important or moralized (another communication 
source inference). Important attitudes often rouse intense emotions in people (Zuwerink 
& Devine, 1996), so a speaker who seems furious or overjoyed (high‑arousal emotions) 
presumably considers the topic important. To some extent, this may convince the recipi‑
ent to also perceive the topic as important, and therefore worthy of attention and cog‑
nitive elaboration (Holbrook et al., 2005), potentially bolstering communication effec‑
tiveness assuming a reasonably strong message. Topics can be important either because 
they are personally relevant, relevant to one’s core social identity groups, or relevant 
to one’s core values (Boninger et al., 1995; Eaton & Visser, 2008). Thus, if the recipi‑
ent feels that they share similar personal circumstances, overlapping social groups, and/
or shared core values with the source, then they may be more likely to infer that the 
speaker’s high‑arousal voice implies that the recipient should also consider the topic to 
be important. Alternatively, voices expressing highly intense emotions may indicate that 
the source considers the topic to be connected with moral significance, given the close 
relationship between emotions and morals (e.g., Haidt, 2001). The association of the 
topic with moral stakes, if communicated to the recipients, could prompt more persis‑
tent, impactful attitudes in recipients (Luttrell et al., 2016). Thus, the CIVA model is not 
intended as an exhaustive set of processes, but its theoretical principles may be useful 
when incorporating other processes by which vocal affect influences communication.
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